The Cost of timing markets and moving to a more conservative investment option

Missing the sharemarket’s five best days in 2020 would have led to a 30% loss compared to doing nothing.

The 2020 covid-19 sharemarket crash provides a timely example of the difficulty and cost of trying to time markets.

The volatility from global sharemarkets has been extreme this year, nevertheless, the best thing would had been to sit back and enjoy the ride, as is often the case.

By way of example, the US S&P 500 sharemarket index reached a historical high on 19th February 2020.  The market then fell into bear market territory (a decline of 20% or more) in record time, taking just 16 trading days, beating the previous record of 44 days set in 1929. 

After falling 33% from the 19th February high global equity markets bounced back strongly over the following weeks, recording their best 50-day advance.

The benchmark dropped more than 5% on five days, four of which occurred in March. The same month also accounted for four of the five biggest gains.

Within the sharp bounce from the 23rd March lows, the US sharemarkets had two 9% single-day increases.  Putting this into perspective, this is about equal to an average expected yearly return within one day!

For all the volatility, the US markets are nearly flat for the period since early February.

A recent Bloomberg article provides a good account of the cost of trying to time markets.

The Bloomberg article provides “One stark statistic highlighting the risk focuses on the penalty an investor incurs by sitting out the biggest single-day gains. Without the best five, for instance, a tepid 2020 becomes a horrendous one: a loss of 30%.”

As highlighted in the Bloomberg article, we all want to be active, we may even panic and sit on the side line, the key point is often the decision to get out can be made easily, however, the decision to get back in is a lot harder.

The cost of being wrong can be high.

Furthermore, there are better ways to manage market volatility, even as extreme as we have encountered this year.

For those interested, the following Kiwi Investor Blog Posts are relevant:

Navigating through a bear market – what should I do?

One of the best discussions I have seen on why to remain invested is provided by FutureSafe in a letter to their client’s 15th March 2020.

FutureSafe provide one reason why it might be the right thing for someone to reduce their sharemarket exposure and three reasons why they might not.

As they emphasis, consult your advisor or an investment professional before making any investment decisions.

I have summarised the main points of the FutureSafe letter to clients in this Post.

The key points to consider are:

  • Risk Appetite should primarily drive your allocation to sharemarkets, not the current market environment;
  • We can’t time markets, not even the professionals;
  • Be disciplined and maintain a well-diversified investment portfolio, this is the best way to limit market declines, rather than trying to time market
  • Take a longer-term view; and
  • Seek out professional investment advice before making any investment decisions

Protecting your portfolio from different market environments

Avoiding large market losses is vital to accumulating wealth and reaching your investment objectives, whether that is attaining a desired standard of living in retirement or a lasting endowment.

The complexity and different approaches to providing portfolio protection has been highlighted by a recent twitter spat between Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Cliff Asness.

The differences in perspectives and approaches is very well captured by Bloomberg’s Aaron Brown article, Taleb-Asness Black Swan Spat Is a Teaching Moment.

I provide a summary of this debate in Table format in this Post.  

Also covered in this Post is an article by PIMCO on Hedging for Different Market Scenarios. This provides another perspective and a summary of different strategies and their trade-offs in different market environments.

Not every type of risk-mitigating strategy can be expected to work in every type of market environment.

Therefore, maintaining an array of diversification strategies is preferred “investors should diversify their diversifiers”.

Sharemarket crashes, what works best in minimising loses, market timing or diversification?

The best way to manage periods of severe sharemarket declines is to have a diversified portfolio, it is impossible to time these episodes.

AQR has evaluated the effectiveness of diversifying investments during market drawdowns, which I cover in this Post.

They recommend adding investments that make money on average and have a low correlation to equities.

Although “hedges”, e.g. Gold, may make money at times of sharemarket crashes, there is a cost, they tend to do worse on average over the longer term.

Alternative investments are more compelling relative to the traditional asset classes in diversifying a portfolio, they provide the benefits of diversification and have higher returns.

Portfolio diversification involves adding new “risks” to a portfolio, this can be hard to comprehend.

Happy investing.

Please see my Disclosure Statement

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.




Protecting your Portfolio from different market environments – including tail risk hedging

Avoiding large market losses is vital to accumulating wealth and reaching your investment objectives, whether that is attaining a desired standard of living in retirement or an ongoing and uninterrupted endowment.

 

The complexity and different approaches to providing portfolio protection (tail-risk hedging) has been highlighted by a recent twitter spat between Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of Black Swan, and Cliff Asness, a pioneer in quant investing.

The differences in perspectives and approaches is very well captured by Bloomberg’s Aaron Brown article, Taleb-Asness Black Swan Spat Is a Teaching Moment.

I provide a summary of the contrasting perspectives in the Table below as outlined by Brown’s article, who considers both men as his friends.

There are certainly some important learnings and insights in contrasting the different approaches.

 

PIMCO recently published an article Hedging for Different Market Scenarios. This provides another perspective.

PIMCO provide a brief summary of different strategies and their trade-offs in diversifying a Portfolio.

They outline four approaches to diversify the risk from investing in sharemarkets (equity risk).

In addition to tail risk hedging, the subject of the twitter spat above between Taleb and Asness, and outlined below, PIMCO consider three other strategies to increase portfolio diversification: Long-term Fixed Income securities (Bonds), managed futures, and alternative risk premia.

PIMCO provide the following Graph to illustrate the effectiveness of the different “hedging” strategies varies by market scenario.PIMCO_Hedging_for_Different_Market_Scenarios_1100_Chart1_58109

As PIMCO note “it’s important for investors to know in what types of environments each strategy is more likely to work and in what environments each are likely to be less effective.”

As they emphasise “not every type of risk-mitigating strategy can be expected to work in every type of market sell-off.”

A brief description of the diversifying strategies is provided below:

  • Long Bonds – holding long term (duration) high quality government bonds (e.g. US and NZ 10-year or long Government Bonds) have been effective when there are sudden declines in sharemarkets. They are less effective when interest rates are rising. (Although not covered in the PIMCO article, there are some questions as to their effectiveness in the future given extremely low interest rates currently.)
  • Managed Futures, or trend following strategies, have historically performed well when markets trend i.e. there is are consistent drawn-out decline in sharemarkets e.g. tech market bust of 2000-2001. These strategies work less well when markets are very volatile, short sharp movements up and down.
  • Alternative risk premia strategies have the potential to add value to a portfolio when sharemarkets are non-trending. Although they generally provide a return outcome independent of broad market movements they struggle to provide effective portfolio diversification benefits when there are major market disruptions. Alternative risk premia is an extension of Factor investing.
  • Tail risk hedging, is often explained as providing a higher degree of reliability at time of significant market declines, this is often at the expense of short-term returns i.e. there is a cost for market protection.

 

A key point from the PIMCO article is that not one strategy can be effective in all market environments.

Therefore, maintaining an array of diversification strategies is preferred “investors should “diversify their diversifiers””.

 

It is well accepted you cannot time markets and the best means to protect portfolios from large market declines is via a well-diversified portfolio, as outlined in this Kiwi Investor Blog Post found here, which coincidentally covers an AQR paper. (The business Cliff Asness is a Founding Partner.)

 

A summary of the key differences in perspectives and approaches between Taleb and Asness as outlined in Aaron Brown’s Bloomberg’s article, Taleb-Asness Black Swan Spat Is a Teaching Moment.

My categorisations Asness Taleb
Defining a tail event Asness refers to the worst events in history for investors, such as the 5% worst one-month returns for the S&P 500 Index.

Research by AQR shows that steep declines that last three months or less do little or no damage to 10-year returns.

It is the long periods of mediocre returns, particularly three years or longer, that damages longer term performance.

Taleb defines “tail events” not by frequency of occurrence in the past, but by unexpectedness. (Black Swan)

Therefore, he is scathing of strategies designed to do well in past disasters, or based on models about likely future scenarios.

 

 

 

Different Emphasis

The emphasis is not only on surviving the tail event but to design portfolios that have the highest probability of generating acceptable long-term returns.   These portfolios will give an unpleasant experience during bad times.

 

Taleb prefers tail-risk hedges that deliver lots of cash in the worst times. Cash provides a more pleasant outcome and greater options at times of a crisis.

Investors are likely facing a host of challenges at the time of market crisis, both financial and nonfinancial, and cash is better.

Different approaches AQR strategies usually involve leverage and unlimited-loss derivatives.

 

Taleb believes this approach just adds new risks to a portfolio. The potential downsides are greater than the upside.
Costs AQR responds that Taleb’s preferred approaches are expensive that they don’t reduce risk.

Also, the more successful the strategy, the more expensive it becomes to implement, that you give up your gains over time e.g. put options on stocks

Taleb argues he has developed methods to deliver cash in crises that are cheap enough that they actually add to long-term returns while reducing risk.

 

 

Investor behaviours Asness argues that investors often adopt Taleb’s like strategies after a severe market decline. Therefore, they pay the high premiums as outlined above. Eventually, they get tire of the paying the premiums during the good times, exit the strategy, and therefore miss the payout on the next crash. Taleb emphasises the bad decisions investors make during a market crisis/panic, in contrast to AQR’s emphasis on bad decisions people make after the market crisis.

 

 

 

 

Good luck, stay healthy and safe.

 

Happy investing.

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

Forecasted investment returns remain disappointing – despite recent market movements

Long-term expected returns from global sharemarkets have not materially changed despite recent sharemarket declines.

The longer term outlook for fixed income returns has deteriorated materially.

There is no doubt the investment environment is going to be challenging, not just in the months ahead, over the medium to longer term as well.

This should prompt some introspection as to the robustness of current portfolios.

From a risk management perspective an assessment should be undertaken to determine if current portfolio allocations are appropriate in meeting client investment objectives over the longer term.

A set and forget strategy does not look appropriate at this time. Serious thought should be given to where expected returns are going to come from over the medium to longer term.

By way of example, the expected long-term return from a traditional Balanced Portfolio, of 60% Equities and 40% Fixed Income, is going to be very challenging.

Arguably, the environment for the Balanced Portfolio has worsened, given return forecasts for fixed income and that they are not expected to provide the same level of portfolio diversification as displayed historically.

The strong performance of fixed income is a key contributing factor to the success of the Balanced Fund over the last 20 years. This portfolio plank has been severely weakened.

 

Asset Class expected forecasted Returns

A clue to future expected returns is outlined in the following Table generated by GMO, which they update on a regular basis.

The Table presents GMO’s 7-Year Asset Class Real Return Forecasts (after inflation of around 2%), as at 31 March 2020.

GMO 7-YEAR ASSET CLASS REAL RETURN FORECASTSGMO 7-Year Asset Class Real Return Forecasts March 2020

 

An indication of the impact of recent market performance on future market forecasts can be gained by comparing current asset class forecast returns to those undertaken previously.

The following Table compares GMO’s 7-Year Asset Class Real Returns as 31 March 2020 to those published for 31 December 2019.

The first column provides the 7-Year return forecasts updated as at 31 March 2020. These are compared to GMO’s return forecast at the beginning of the year.

The last column in the Table below outlines the change in asset class forecasted returns over the quarter.

31-Mar-20

31-Dec-19

Change

US Large

-1.5%

-4.9%

3.4%

US Small

1.4%

-2.2%

3.6%

International Equities

1.9%

-0.8%

2.7%

Emerging Markets

4.9%

3.5%

1.4%

US Fixed Income

-3.8%

-1.8%

-2.0%

International Fixed Income Hedged

-4.3%

-3.5%

-0.8%

Emerging Market Debt

3.0%

-0.6%

3.6%

US Cash

-0.2%

0.2%

-0.4%

       
US Balanced (60% Equities / 40% Fixed Income)

-2.4%

-3.7%

1.2%

International Balanced

-0.6%

-1.9%

1.3%

The following observations can be made from the Table above:

  • Although the return outcomes for equities have improved, they remain low, under 2% p.a. after inflation;
  • Emerging markets equities offer the most value amongst global sharemarkets, generally returns outside of the US are more attractive;
  • Expected returns from developed market fixed income markets have deteriorated, particularly for the US;
  • The expected outlook for Emerging Market debt has improved materially over the last three months; and
  • The return outlook for the Balanced Fund remains disappointing despite an improvement.

 

Impact of recent market movements on expected returns

The degree to which forecast sharemarket returns have increased may disappoint, particular given the extreme levels of market volatility experienced over the first quarter of 2020.

This in part reflects that global sharemarkets as a group “only” fell 11.5% over the first three months of the year. It probably felt like more.

Furthermore, although declining sharemarkets now translates to higher expected returns in the future, it is not a one for one relationship.

 

The relationship between current market performance and the impact on forecast returns is well captured by a recent Research Affiliates article.

As they note “When a market corrects dramatically, say, 30%, long-term expected returns do not rise by the same 30%.”

They illustrate this point using the US market (S&P 500 Index).

 

Research Affiliates estimate that a 30% pullback (drawdown) in the US sharemarket implies an increase in expected return of 1.7% a year for the next decade.

This is based on their assumptions for average real earnings per share over a rolling 10-year period for US companies and their estimate of fair value for the US sharemarket over the longer term. For an estimation of fair value they apply a cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio.

The return estimate is based on the level and valuation of the US sharemarket on the 19th February, when the US market reached a historical high level (Peak).

The interrelationship between current market value, expected earnings, and the estimate of longer term value and their impact on expected returns is captured in the following diagram.

Based on market valuation, as measured by CAPE on 19th February 2020, the right-hand side displays the estimated change in expected returns from a decline in the US sharemarket from the peak in February e.g. a 30% drop in the S&P 500 Index from the Peak translates to a 1.7% change in Expected Return from valuation (change in CAPE).

The central point remains, a drop in the sharemarket today translates into higher expected returns.

Research Affiliates CAPE and Expected Return Estimates at Different Market Prices

The diagram above also captures the changing valuation of the market, as measured by CAPE, to a decline in the US sharemarket, as outlined on the left-hand side.

 

Research Affiliates long-term expected returns for a wide range of markets can be found on their homepage.

 

Caution in using Longer-term market forecasts

Forecasting the expected return for sharemarkets is extremely tricky, to say the least, with the likely variation in potential outcomes very widely dispersed.

Forecasting fixed income returns has a higher level of certainty.  The current level of interest rates provides a good indication of future returns. Given the dramatic fall in interest rates over the last three months, the expected returns from fixed income has deteriorated.

 

Nevertheless, caution should be taken when considering longer-term market forecasts.

This is emphasised in the Research Affiliates article, their “expected return forecasts also come with a warning label: Long-term expected returns, unto themselves, are not sufficient for short-term decision making. Ignoring this warning will most likely lead to impaired wealth.

Ten-year return forecasts offer valuable guidance to a buy-and-hold investor about the return they are likely to earn over the next decade. They provide no information, however, about when to buy or sell and do not identify a market top or bottom.”

 

Challenging Investment Environment

From a risk management perspective an assessment should be undertaken to determine if current portfolio allocations are appropriate in meeting client investment objectives over the longer term.

A set and forget strategy does not look appropriate at this time. Serious thought should be given to where expected returns are going to come from over the medium to longer term

There is no doubt the investment environment is going to be challenging, not just in the months ahead, over the medium to longer term as well.

 

This should prompt some introspection as to the robustness of current portfolios.

For example, the low expected return environment led GMO to declare earlier in the year it is time to move away from the Balanced Portfolio. The Balanced Portfolio is riskier than many people think.

The low expected return environment and reduced portfolio diversification benefits of fixed income is why the Balanced Fund is expected to underperform.

 

It is also partly driving institutional investors to develop more robust portfolios by investing outside of the traditional asset classes of equities and fixed income by increasing their allocations to alternative investments.

As highlighted by a recent CAIA survey investments into alternatives, such as private equity, real assets, and liquid alternatives, are set to grow over the next five years, becoming a bigger proportion of the global investment universe.

 

Research by AQR highlights that diversifying outside of the traditional asset is the best way to manage through severe sharemarket declines. Furthermore, diversification should work in good and bad times

 

For those interested, posts on the optimal private equity allocation and characteristics and portfolio benefits of real assets may be of interest.  Real assets offer real portfolio diversification benefits, particularly in different economic environments.

My Post Investing in a Challenging Investment Environment outlines suggested changes to current investment approaches that could be considered.

 

Good luck, stay healthy and safe.

 

 

Happy investing.

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

We will get through this – coronavirus

One of the better discussions available on the coronavirus is the CFA Institute interview between Laurence B. Siegel and Andrew “Drew” Senyei, MD.

The most important point to take away is the concluding remark “the advances in medical knowledge and molecular biology, especially in the last decade, and with the full focus of the world on this one challenge — we will get through this.”

The discussion is wide ranging and will help in providing clarity on several issues e.g. the importance of testing, how the virus impacts on the body, and the trade-off between preventing or slowing the spread of the disease at all costs versus the cost on the economy and people’s mental health, including what testing is required to get people back to work.

 

The interview begins by acknowledging that although our knowledge of the virus is increasing there is still lots to learn about it. It is evident that this coronavirus is different from previous coronaviruses.

One important unknown is how lethal it is. This relates to the case fatality rate (CFR). This is the number of people who die of the disease, expressed as a percentage of the number of people who have it.

As you may be aware, there are a number of problems in measuring this currently:

  • More testing is needed to know how many people who have had it, especially asymptomatic patients – tested positive for the virus but showed no symptoms.
  • The reporting of deaths has also been problematic, did they die because of the virus or was there an underlying ailment e.g. cancer or heart disease. The difference between died with and died from.

The best estimate currently is that the CFR of the coronavirus is higher than the flu, but it is unlikely to be as high as SARS.

Also, the CFR for the coronavirus is likely to fall as further testing is undertaken, this was the experience with SARS.

The experience on the cruise ship, The Diamond Princess, provides an insight into the likely CFR, and interestingly, over half those tested were asymptomatic. This is discussed in more detail in the article.

The issue of incomplete statistics is highlighted in comparing the outcomes between Italy and South Korea. This comes down to the level of testing and the variations in the way different countries are testing.

Social distancing is having a positive impact. Particularly from protecting the health care system. Ideally, we want “the density of new cases presenting in any geographic area at any given time to be as low as possible and over as long a time period as possible to prevent a surge on the health care system.”

There is a great discussion around the issues with testing. There are a lot of variables.  At the risk of sounding repetitive we need lots of testing, “We need to know how much of the disease is out there so we can have the health care resources and physicians to respond to that surge, where and if it occurs.”

 

Economic Trade-off

The latter half of the article covers the issue of the trade-off between preventing or slowing the spread of the disease at all costs versus the cost on the economy and people’s mental health.

The argument being, should we ease up relatively quickly on policies that discourage work and income and social interaction, otherwise we will severely injure the economic life.

Is there an optimum or balance between the two extremes?

 

Initially, given the unknows, erring on the side of caution would appear appropriate.

Nevertheless, there is an argument for considering “a rational middle ground and that is: We have to first understand if this is peaking. And remember when you look at new case rates, you’re actually lagging by two weeks.”

Understanding more about the virus will help in getting the economy back up and running.  More testing is needed.

“I would look at those [new case rates], and then at hospitalizations and intensive care utilization, and see if that’s peaking because that is the most pressing problem. Then I would look at the rates by population density and see where the wave is happening more locally and usher resources there.”

The discussion comes back to more but different testing, to get a better sense of who’s had the infection, who’s over it, and who’s protected at least for a while.

This is an interesting discussion and highlights a likely path to getting people back to work. .

The key is to identify those individuals already immune and not likely to get infected or infect others back to work.

Protecting the elderly is important, therefore it is suggested “to look at the density of the elderly and make sure resources are adequate for that particular region — not just equipment and supplies, but personnel.”

Senyei concludes “I would invest really heavily in the basic biology and in vaccine development which is two years out. I think you’re going to need a vaccine and you’ll probably need a new vaccine like you do for the flu every year. This virus will mutate.”

“Now all that takes money, time, and coordination — but people are working on it and I think, if we did that, we could sort of get back to the economy being an economy.”

As highlighted above, they conclude by acknowledging that we will get through this.

 

Stay safe and healthy.

 

Happy investing.

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

 

 

Navigating through a Bear market – what should I do?

To all Kiwi Investor Blog readers, I hope you are staying safe and healthy. My thoughts are with you from a health perspective and for those facing the economic consequences on businesses and families from the spread of the coronavirus.

 

In the current market environment there is much uncertainty and many are wondering what to do with their investments.

The key questions being asked are should we switch to a more conservative investment or get out the markets all together.

 

One of the best discussions on why to remain invested is provided by FutureSafe in a letter to their client’s 15th March.

FutureSafe provide one reason why it might be the right thing for someone to reduce their sharemarket exposure and three reasons why they might not.

They have reproduced the letter in the hope that it might be helpful and of interest to the broader investing community.

As they emphasis, please consult your advisor or an investment professional before making any investment decisions. In New Zealand, the FMA has also provided recent guidance on this issue, KiwiSaver providers should be providing general (class) advice to members at this time. Their full guidance on Kiwisaver Advice is here.

 

I have provided the main points below of the FutureSafe letter to clients, nevertheless the letter is well worth reading in full.

The first question is do you have too much invested in the market?

As FutureSafe highlight, the average declines of bear markets since WWII have been over 30%, with some declines as large as 60%. It has generally taken on average 2 years to recover.

 

My last Post, What to expect, navigating the current Bear-Market, presented research from Goldman Sachs on the historical analysis of bear markets in US equities going back to the 1800s. At this stage, we are likely experiencing an Event-Driven Bear market.  These Bear markets tend to be less severe, but the speed of the fall in markets is quicker, as is the recover.

However, as Goldman Sachs note none of the previous Event-Driven Bear markets were triggered by the outbreak of a virus, nor were interest rates so low at the start of the market decline.

Historically Event-Driven bear markets on average see falls of 29%, last 9 months and recover within 15 months. Nevertheless, the current Bear could transform into a cyclical bear market if containment efforts lead to a larger global recession than anticipated.

 

Back to FutureSafe. You should only take the risk you can stomach, or technically speaking, is aligned with your “risk appetite”. Which is a level of risk that does not keep you awake at night.  Unfortunately, we often don’t know our risk appetite until we experience significant market events like we are experiencing currently. We are often over-confident as to the level of market volatility we can tolerate.

FurtureSafe conclude “Now that we are in a downturn, if you have come to the conclusion that your risk appetite is not what you thought it was, it’s perfectly OK to acknowledge that and change your safety net accordingly.”

However, before you do anything, FutureSafe ask you to read through and consider a few reasons why not to do anything at this time might be appropriate.

Reason 1

If management of risk appetite is not your motivation, perhaps you are planning on selling now, with the conviction markets will continue to fall, and you plan on buying back in later.

You are essentially making an active investment decision and attempting to time markets.

Timing markets is very hard to do. Professional Investors are not very good at it.

The data on the average mutual fund investor is also not very complimentary. As FutureSafe note the “the average mutual fund investor has not stayed invested for a long enough period of time to reap the rewards that the market can offer more disciplined investors. The data also shows that when investors react, they generally make the wrong decision.”  A mutual Fund is like a Unit Trust or KiwiSaver Fund in New Zealand.

I depart from the FutureSafe article and provide the graph below from PIMCO.

As PIMCO highlight, “Through no fault of their own – and especially when market volatility strikes – investors tend to be their own worst enemy.”

The graph below highlights that investors do not capture all of the returns from the market, which can be attributed to behavioural biases that leads to inappropriate timing of  buying and selling.

This investor behavioural gap is well documented.

In reference to market timing and in one short sentence, FutureSafe say “We’re probably not as good at these active calls as we think we are, and it might hurt more than help.”

PIMOC Behaviour gap

Reason 2

A large portion of returns are earned on days markets make large gains.

Although the extreme volatility being witnessed currently is very painful to watch, amongst them are explosive up days. Attempting to time markets might cause you to miss these valuable up days.

The research on this is also very clear.

As outlined in the Table below, if you had missed the top 15 biggest return days your yearly return would have been 3.6% compared to 7% per year if you had remained fully invested (this is over the period January 1990 to March 2020 and being invested in the US S&P 500 Index).

Missing large daily returns

Of course, the same can be said if you missed the largest down days. Nevertheless, good luck at avoiding these days and still being able to fully capture the returns from equity markets.  The down days represent the risk of investing in shares.

Most important is having a disciplined investment approach and an investment portfolio consistent with your risk appetite and is truly diversified so as to limit the impact of the poor periods of performance in sharemarkets.

In summary, FutureSafe note, “Missing just a few of the top up days, can cost you a large chunk of the market’s returns.”

 

Reason 3

Take a long-term perspective.

Overtime, and with hindsight, large market declines look like minor setbacks over the longer term, the very long term.

This is quite evident from the following graph.

Remember, the stock market fell by 20% over one day in 1987, the dot-com crash of 2000 or even the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 don’t look to bad with a longer term perspective.

Take a longer term perspective

As FutureSafe conclude “If you really don’t need the money for a long period of time (e.g. 10 or 15 years) these are best to ride out because they look a lot better in the rear view mirror than when you are going through it.”

“If you have a long enough horizon (10 to 15 years or more), the chances of doing well in the stock market is still quite good.”

 

Therefore, the key points to consider are:

  • Risk Appetite should primarily drive your allocation to sharemarkets, not the current market environment;
  • We can’t time markets, not even the professionals;
  • Be disciplined and maintain a well-diversified investment portfolio, this is the best way to limit market declines, rather than trying to time markets;
  • Take a longer-term view; and
  • Seek out professional investment advice

 

Keep safe and healthy.

 

Happy investing.

 

Please read my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

What too expect, navigating the current Bear Market

After reaching a historical high on 19th February the US sharemarket, as measured by the S&P 500 Index, recorded:

  • Its fastest correction from a peak, a fall of 10% but less than 19%, taking just 6 days; and
  • Its quickest period to fall into a Bear market, a fall of greater than 20%, 21 days.

The S&P 500 entered Bear market territory on March 12th, when the market fell 9.5%, the largest daily drop since Black Monday in October 1987.

The 21 day plunge from 19th February’s historical high was half the time of the previous record set in 1929.

S&P500

Source: ETF.com

This follows the longest Bull market in history, which is a run up in the market without incurring a 20% or more fall in value. The last Bear market occurred in 2008 during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).

The 11-year bull market grew in tandem with one of the longest economic expansions in US history, this too now looks under threat with a recession in the US now looking likely over the first half of 2020. Certainly, global recession appears most likely.

 

Global sharemarkets around the world have suffered similar declines, some have suffered greater declines, particularly across Europe.

Markets lost their complacency mid-late February on the spreading of the coronavirus from China to the rest of the world and after Chinese manufacturing data that was not only way below expectations but was also the worst on record.

A crash in the oil price, which slumped more than 30%, added to market anxieties.

 

Extreme Volatility

The recent period has been one of extreme market volatility, not just in sharemarkets, but currencies, fixed income, and commodity markets.

As the Table, courtesy of Bianco Research, below highlights, three of the five days in the week beginning 9th March are amongst the 20 biggest daily gains and losses.

After the 9.5% decline on 12th March, the market rebounded 9.3% the following day. The 7.6% decline on the 9th March was, to date, the 20th largest decline recorded by the S&P 500.

2020 is joining an infamous group of years, which include 1929, 1987, and 2008.

Extreme volatility

Where do we go from here?

Great question, and I wish I knew.

For guidance, this research paper by Goldman Sachs (GS) is helpful: Bear Essentials: a guide to navigating a bear market

To get a sense as to how much markets are likely to fall, and for how long, they look at the long-term history of the US sharemarket. They also categories Bear markets into three types, reflecting that Bear markets have different triggers and characteristics.

The three types as defined by GS are:

  • Structural bear market – triggered by structural imbalances and financial bubbles. Very often there is a ‘price’ shock such as deflation that follows.
  • Cyclical bear markets – typically a function of rising interest rates, impending recessions and falls in profits. They are a function of the economic cycle.
  • Event-driven bear markets – triggered by a one-off ‘shock’ that does not lead to a domestic recession (such as a war, oil price shock, EM crisis or technical market dislocation).

They then plot US Bear Markets and Recoveries since the 1800s, as outlined in the following Table:

Historical US Bear markets

Source: Goldman Sachs

From this they can characterise the historical averages of the three types of Bear markets, as outlined at the bottom of the Table:

GS summarise:

  • Structural bear markets on average see falls of 57%, last 42 months and take 111 months to get back to starting point in nominal terms (134 months in real terms (after inflation)).
  • Cyclical bear markets on average see falls of 31%, last 27 months and take 50 months to get back to starting point in nominal terms (73 months in real terms).
  • Event-driven bear markets on average see falls of 29%, last 9 months and recover within 15 months in nominal terms (71 months in real terms).

 

In their opinion GS currently think we are in an Event-driven Bear market. Generally these Bear markets are less severe, but the speed of the fall in markets is quicker, as is the recover. However, as they note none of the previous Event-Driven Bear markets were triggered by the outbreak of a Virus, nor were interest rates so low at the start of the market decline.

Therefore, they conclude, a fall of between 20-25% can be expected, and the rebound will be swift.

This makes for an interest couple of quarters, in which the economic data and company profit announcements are sure to get worse, yet equity markets will likely look through this for evidence of a recovery in economic activity over the second half of this year.

 

Happy investing.

 

Please read my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

 

Sobering low return estimates

AQR has updated their estimates of medium-term (5- to 10-year) expected returns for the major asset classes.

Their expected real return for the traditional U.S. 60/40 portfolio (60% Equities / 40% Bonds) is just 2.4%, around half its long-term average of nearly 5% (since 1900).

It is also down from 2.9% estimated last year.

 

AQR conclude that medium term expected returns are “sobering low”. Their return estimates are after inflation (real returns) and are compounded per annum returns.

“They suggest that over the next decade, many investors may struggle to meet return objectives anchored to a rosier past”.

“We again emphasize that our return estimates for all asset classes are highly uncertain. The estimates in this report do not in themselves warrant aggressive tactical allocation responses — but they may warrant other kinds of responses. For example, investment objectives may need to be reassessed, even if this necessitates higher contribution rates and lower expected payouts. And the case for diversifying away from traditional equity and term premia is arguably stronger than ever.”

 

The AQR estimate for a Balance Fund return are similar to those published recently in a CFA Institute article of 3.1%.

 

AQR update their estimates annually.  They manage over US$186 billion in investment assets.

 

Return Estimates

Reflecting the strong returns experienced in 2019 across all markets, particularly US equities, future returns estimates are now lower compared to last year.

This is Highlighted in the Table below.

Medium-Term Expected Real Returns

Market

2019 Estimate

2020 Estimate

US Equities

4.3%

4.0%

Non-US Developed Equities

5.1%

4.7%

Emerging Markets

5.4%

5.1%

US 10-year Government Bonds

0.8%

0.0%

Non US-10 Year Government Bonds

-0.3%

-0.6%

US Investment Grade Credit

1.6%

0.9%

 

Bloomberg have a nice summary of the key results:

  • Anticipated returns for U.S. equities dropped to 4% from 4.3% a year earlier.
  • U.S. Treasuries tracked the move, with AQR predicting buyers will merely break even.
  • Non-U.S. sovereigns slipped deeper into negative territory, with a projected loss of 0.6% a year.
  • Emerging-market equities will lead the way, the firm projects, with a return of 5.1%.

 

This article by Institutional Investor also provides a good run down of AQR’s latest return estimates.

More detail of return estimates can be found within the following document, which I accessed from LinkedIn.

 

Lastly, AQR provide the following guidance in relation to the market return estimates:

  • For shorter horizons, returns are largely unpredictable and any predictability has tended to mainly reflect momentum and the macro environment.
  • Our estimates are intended to assist investors with their strategic allocation and planning decisions, and, in particular, with setting appropriate medium-term expectations.
  • They are highly uncertain, and not intended for market timing.

 

In addition to the CFA Article mentioned above, AQRs estimates are consistent with consensus expected returns I covered in a previous Post.

 

Although AQR’s guidance to diversify away from traditional equity and fixed income might be like asking a barber whether you need a haircut, surely from a risk management perspective the diversification away from the traditional asset classes should be considered in line with the prudent management of investment portfolios and consistency with industry best practice?

In my Post, Investing in a Challenging Investment Environment, suggested changes to current investment approaches are covered.

Finally, Global Economic and Market outlook provides a shorter term outlook for those interested.

 

Happy Investing

Please read my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Past Decade of strong returns unlikely to be repeated

The current return assumption for the average US public pension fund is 7.25%, according to the National Association of State Retirement Administrators (NASRA), highlighted in a recent CFA Institute Blog: Global Pension Funds the Coming Storm.

This compares to the CFA Institute’s (CFA) article expected return for a Balanced Portfolio of 3.1% over the next 10 years.  A Balanced Portfolio is defined as 60% Equities and 40% Fixed Income.

Therefore, the article concludes that a 7.25% return assumption is “overly optimistic in a low return interest rate environment”.

The expected low return environment will place increasing pressure on growing pension liabilities and funding deficits. This is over and above the pressures of an aging population and the shift toward Defined Contribution (DC) superannuation schemes e.g. KiwiSaver.

This environment will likely require a different approach to the traditional portfolio in meeting the growing liabilities of Define Benefit (DB) Plans and in meeting investment return objectives for DC superannuation Funds such as KiwiSaver in New Zealand.

The value will be in identifying and implementing the appropriate underlying investment strategies.

 

Past Returns

For comparison purposes an International Balanced Portfolio, as defined above, has returned around 7.8% over the last 10 years, based on international fixed income and global sharemarket indices.

A New Zealand Balanced Portfolio has returned 10.3%, based on NZ capital market indices only.

New Zealand has had one of the best performing sharemarkets in the world over the last 10 years, returning 13.5% per annum (p.a.), this compares to the US +11.3% p.a. and China -0.7% p.a.. Collectively, global sharemarkets returned 10.2% p.a. in the 2010s.

Similarly, the NZ fixed income markets, Government Bonds, returned 5.4% p.a. last decade. The NZ 5-year Government Bond fell 4.1% over the 10-year period, boosting the returns from fixed income. Interestingly, the US 5-year Bond is only 1% lower compared to what it was at the beginning of 2010.

 

It is worth noting that the US economy has not experienced a recession for over ten years and the last decade was the only decade in which the US sharemarket has not experienced a 20% or more decline. How good the last decade has been for the US sharemarket was covered in a previous Post.

 

In New Zealand, as with the rest of the world, a Balanced Portfolio has served investors well over the last ten or more years. This reflects the strong returns from both components of the portfolio, but more particularly, the fixed income component has benefited from the continue decline in interest rates over the last 30 years to historically low levels (5000 year lows on some measures!).

 

Future Return Expectations

Future returns from fixed income are unlikely to be as strong as experienced over the last decade. New Zealand interest rates are unlikely to fall another 4% over the next 10-years!

Likewise, returns from equities may struggle to deliver the same level of returns as generated over the last 10-years. Particularly the US and New Zealand, which on several measures look expensive. As a result, lower expected returns should be expected.

The lower expected return environment is highlighted in the CFA article, they provide market forecasts and consensus return expectations for a number of asset classes.

 

As the article rightly points out, one of the best estimates of future returns from fixed income is the current interest rate.

As the graph below from the article highlights, “the starting bond yield largely determines the nominal total return over the next decade. So what you see is what you get.”

 

US Bond Returns vs. US Starting Bond Yields

US Bond Returns vs US Starting Bond Yields

 

In fact, this relation has a score of 97% out of 100%, it is a pretty good predictor.

The current NZ 10 Government Bond yield is ~1.65%, the US 10-Year ~1.90%.

 

Predicting returns from equity markets is more difficult and comes with far less predictability.

Albeit, the article concludes “low returns for US equities over the next 10 years.”

 

Expected Returns from a Balanced Portfolio

The CFA Article determines the future returns from a Balance Portfolio “By combining the expected returns from equities and bonds based on historical data, we can create a return matrix for a traditional 60/40 portfolio. Our model anticipates an annualized return of 3.1% for the next 10 years. That is well below the 7.25% assumed rate of return and is awful news for US public pension funds.”

Subsequent 10-Year Annualized Return for Traditional 60/40 Equity/Bond Portfolio

Subsequent 10 years annualized Return for Traditional 60 40 Equity Bond Portfolio.png

 

This is a sobering outlook as we head into the new decade.

Over the last decade portfolio returns have primarily been driven by traditional market returns, equity and fixed income “beta“. This may not be the case when we look back in ten-years’ time.

 

This is a time to be cautious. Portfolio strategy will be important, nevertheless, implementation of the underlying strategies and manager selection will be vitally important, more so than the last decade. The management of portfolio costs will also be an essential consideration.

It is certainly not a set and forget environment. The challenging of current convention will likely not go unrewarded.

Forewarned is forearmed.

 

Global Pension Crisis

The Global Pension crisis is well documented. It has been described as a Financial Climate Crisis, the risks are increasingly with you, the individual, as I covered in a previous Post.

As the CFA article notes, the expected low return environment adds to this crisis, as a result deeper cuts to government pensions and greater increases in the retirement age are likely. This will led to greater in-equality.

 

This is a serious issue for society, luckily there is the investment knowledge available now to help increase the probability of attaining a desired standard of living in retirement.

However, it does require a shift in paradigm and a fresh approach to planning for retirement, but not a radical departure from current thinking and practices.

For those interested, I cover this topic in more depth in my post: Designing a New Retirement System. This post has been the most read Kiwi Investor Blog post. It covers a retirement system framework as proposed by Nobel Laureate Professor Robert Merton in his 2012 article: Funding Retirement: Next Generation Design.

 

Lastly, the above analysis is consistent with recent calls for the Death of the Balanced Portfolio, which I have also Blogged on.

Nevertheless, I think the Balanced Portfolio is being replaced due to the evolution within the wealth management industry globally, which I covered in a previous Post: Evolution within Wealth Management, the death of the Policy Portfolio. This covers the work by the EDHEC-Risk Institute on Goals-Based Investing.

 

In another Posts I have covered consensus expected returns, which are in line with those outlined in the CFA article and a low expected return environment.

In my Post, Investing in a Challenging Investment Environment, suggested changes to current investment approaches are covered.

Finally, Global Economic and Market outlook provides a shorter-to-medium term outlook for those interested.

 

Please note, I do not receive any payment or financial benefit from Kiwi Investor Blog, and a link to my Discloser Statement is provided below.

 

Happy investing.

Please read my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

How good will the next decade be for Investing?

“Adjusted for risk—or, more precisely, the volatility stock investors had to bear—gains in the S&P 500 index since Dec. 31, 2009, are poised to be the highest of any decade since at least the 1950s.” as outlined in a recent Bloomberg article, The Bull Market Almost No One Saw Coming.

Who would had thought that back in 2009?

 

As the Bloomberg article highlights, it has been a relatively smooth ride of late; equity market volatility has fallen in line with the sharp decline in interest rates over the last ten years.

Also assisting the smoother ride in US equity markets has been the lower volatility in US economic activity. The US economy has expanded by 1.6% to 2.9% in each of the previous nine years, a similar level of economic activity is expected in 2019. According to Bloomberg, based on standard deviation, that’s the smallest fluctuation over any 10-year stretch in data going back to 1930.

 

In fact, the 2010s were the first decade without a bear market, defined as a 20% drop from any peak.

For the record, US equities:

  • experienced six separate 10% corrections over the 2010s (to date!); and
  • In total have returned 249% in the past 10 years, about 1.2 times the historical average.

The US is amid the longest bull market ever (longest period in history without a bear market).

These gains have come when least expected.

 

They also follow a -20% decline over the previous decade (2000 – 2009). Which includes a -52% decline of the Great Recessions (Global Financial Crisis (GFC) – measured over the period October 2007 – February 2009. As at October 2007 the S&P 500 Index had only climbed 11% since the beginning of the decade.

 

How Good has it been?

As Bloomberg note, based on the Sharpe ratio, which tracks the performance of equity markets relative to Government Bonds, adjusted for the volatility of equity markets, the current Sharpe Ratio of the S&P500 is the best among any decade since at least Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency.

The last decade has not been all plain sailing and includes the following market events: May 2010 flash crash, Europe’s sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and ’12, and China’s currency devaluation in 2015.

A previous Post covered these market declines: Equity Market Declines in Perspective

More recently global markets have had to endure an ongoing trade and technology dispute between the US and China.

Central Bank actions, including the lowering of interest rates and quantitative easing (i.e. buying of market securities, mainly fixed income) has helped ease markets anxiety. This is reflected in the decline of market volatility indices, such as the VIX Index.

 

What does the next decade look like?

The sharemarket and economy are linked.

Generally a bear market (i.e. 20% or more fall in value) does not occur without a recession (a recession is often defined as two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth).

Currently there are no excesses within the US economy, that normally precede a recession e.g. elevate inflation, excessive house prices, and high household debt levels.

This would tend to indicate that global equity markets can move higher.

 

Nevertheless, US equity market valuations are high, as are those of global Fixed Income markets.  This environment has resulted in many reporting the death of the traditional Balanced Portfolio (60% listed equities / 40% fixed income).

There are growing expectations that returns over the next decade will be lower than those experienced over the last ten years, as highlight in a previous Post: Low Return Environment Forecasted.

That Post has the following Table, GMO’s expected 7 year returns as at 31 July 2019. They estimated the real returns (returns after 2.2% inflation) for the following asset classes as follows:

Share Markets Annual Real Return Forecasts
US Large Capitalised Shares -3.7%
International Shares 0.6%
Emerging Markets 5.3%
Fixed Income Markets
US Fixed Income -1.7%
International Fixed Income Hedged -3.7%
Emerging Debt 0.7%
US Cash 0.2%

As GMO highlight, these are forward looking based on their reasonable beliefs and they are no guarantee of future performance.   Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated in forward looking statements.

 

It is very rare for decade of strong returns to be followed by a similar like decade.  Only time will tell.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that a challenging investment environment is likely in the not too distant future. This Post outlines how to prepare and consider investing for such a challenging environment: Investing in a Challenging Investment Environment.

 

Happy investing.

Please read my Disclosure Statement

 

For a historical perspective of previous sharemarket corrections and bear markets please see my previous Post: History of Sharemarket corrections – An Anatomy of equity market corrections

Meanwhile, this Post, Recessions, Inverted Yield Curves and Sharemarket Returns, outlines the inter-play between the economic cycle and sharemarket returns.

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Low Return Environment Forecasted

Many commentators highlight the likelihood of a low return environment over the next 5 -10 years or more.

Even looking through the shorter-term challenges of the current market environment as highlighted in a recent Post, many publicly available forecasts underline the potential for a low return environment over the longer term.

The most often referenced longer-term return forecasts are the GMO 7 Year Asset Class Forecast.

As at 31 July 2019 they estimated the real returns (returns after 2.2% inflation) for the following asset classes as follows:

Share Markets

Annual Real Return Forecasts

US Large Capitalised Shares

-3.7%

International Shares

0.6%

Emerging Markets

5.3%

   
Fixed Income Markets  
US Fixed Income

-1.7%

International Fixed Income Hedged

-3.7%

Emerging Debt

0.7%

US Cash

0.2%

 

As GMO highlight, these are forward looking returns based on their reasonable beliefs and they are no guarantee of future performance.

Actual results may differ materially from those anticipated in forward looking statements.

 

The variation in sequence of returns is an additional consideration e.g. global sharemarkets could continue to move higher and then fall sharply to generate a 0.6% annual return over the next seven years. Or they could do the reverse, fall sharply within the next year and then float higher over the next 6 years to generate the 0.6% return.

 

The sequencing of returns is important for those in the retirement death zone, see my previous Post on the riskiest time of saving for and being in retirement.

 

Looking at the return forecasts the following observations can be made:

  • Within equity markets Emerging Markets are offering more value and US equities the least; and
  • The return expectations for Fixed Income are very dire, particularly for those developed markets outside of the US.

 

For comparison purposes, the long-term return of US equities is 6.5%.

 

The Fixed Income returns reflect that more than $US15 trillion of fixed income securities across Europe and Japan are trading on a negative yield.

Based on some measures, interest rates are at their lowest level in 5,000 years!

 

GMO is not alone with such longer-term market forecasts, those from Research Affiliates and State Street are provided below. They all have different methodologies and approaches to calculating their forecasts. Notably, they are all pointed in a similar direction.

 

This analysis highlights that outstanding returns have been delivered over the last 10 years, particularly if you are invested in the US and New Zealand sharemarkets and have had longer dated interest rate exposures.

The Balance Portfolio (60% Equities and 40%) has benefited from this environment.

The last 10 years have been amongst the best for a New Zealand investor invested in a Balanced Portfolio, if they had managed to stay fully invested during that time.

The New Zealand sharemarket has returned 13.3% over the last 10 years and New Zealand Government Bonds 5.9%. Therefore, a Balanced Fund has returned 10.3% over the last decade!

Global Equites have returned 10.0%, led higher by the US sharemarket, and Global Bonds 4.3% over the last 10 years. Globally, the Balanced Portfolio has benefited from the 35 year long decline in interest rates.

 

Therefore, the forecast returns are pretty frightening from a Balanced Fund perspective. Certainly, returns are not likely to be as strong over the next ten years as they have been over the last decade.

This calls into question the level diversification of a Balanced Fund of only equities and fixed income.

This issue can be considered from two angles, the need to increase the level of diversification within a Balanced Portfolio and the effectiveness of fixed income in providing diversification benefits to a Balanced Portfolio given historically low interest rates.

On the first issue, although a lack of true portfolio diversification has not disadvantaged investors greatly over the last 5-10 years, the potential to earn other sources of returns from true portfolio diversification may be of more value over the next 10 years. It is certainly a risk that should be considered and managed.

With regards the effectiveness of fixed income in diversify sharemarket risk in the future, this dynamic is best captured by the following insightful observation by Louis Grave: investors are hedging overvalued growth stocks with overvalued bonds.

What he is saying, is that given current valuations in the US of both the sharemarket and fixed income a Balanced Portfolio no longer has the degree of diversification it once had.

Of course, interest rates could fall further, and provide some offset from a falling sharemarket, as they have historically. Nevertheless, the effectiveness and extent of this offset is limited given historically low interest rates.

Most importantly, given current valuations, there is the scenario where both fixed income and sharemarkets underperform at the same time. This would be like the stagflation environment of 1970, where inflation is rising, and economic growth is muted.  This is a scenario worth considering.

In my mind the biggest risks to portfolios are in longer term fixed income securities or “bond proxies”, such as slow-growth and dividend-oriented investments.  Listed Property and infrastructure securities would fall into this definition.

It is quite likely that those looking for diversification benefits from listed property, global and domestic, and listed infrastructure, are likely to be disappointed. As they would had been during the Global Financial Crisis. They only provide limited portfolio diversification benefits, not true portfolio diversification.

 

The expected low returns environment throws up a lot of issues to consider:

  • True Portfolio diversification. Institutional investors accept that portfolio diversification does not come from investing in more and more asset classes. This has diminishing diversification benefits e.g. adding global listed property or infrastructure to a multi-asset portfolio that includes global equities.   True portfolio diversification is achieved by investing in different risk factors that drive the asset classes e.g. duration, economic growth, low volatility, value, and growth. Investors are compensated for being exposed to a range of different risks.

 

  • Consistent with the above, there is a growing evolution within the Wealth Management Industry, a paradigm shift which is resulting in the death of the Policy Portfolio (i.e. Balanced Portfolio).

 

  • The growing risks with traditional market indices and index funds, as highlighted by the low return forecasts.

 

  • Increased innovation within Exchange Traded Funds as investors seek to diversify their traditional market exposures.

 

I plan to write more on the last two points in future Posts.

 

Happy investing.

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand.  Building more Robust Investment Portfolios

 

 

Research Affiliates – 10 Year Forecast Real (After Inflation)

Share Markets

Real Return Forecasts

US Large Capitalised Shares

0.7%

International Shares

3.2%

Emerging Markets

7.7%

   
Fixed Income Markets  
US Fixed Income

-0.8%

International Fixed Income Hedged

-0.5%

Emerging Debt

4.2%

US Cash

-0.3%

 

State Street also provides:

  • They are more optimistic in relation to developed market sharemarket, with Emerging Markets outperforming developed markets, Global Listed Property underperforms both developed and emerging market equities
  • They see very low returns from Global Fixed Income.