Is All-Passive Really the Best Thing for Target-Date Funds?

A recent AB article highlights the limitation of some Target-Date Funds (Life Cycle Funds).

AB propose:

“With market returns expected to be lower going forward, target-date funds that invest in passively managed underlying components are at risk of underdelivering. We think diversifying beyond traditional asset classes and tapping alpha opportunities with a multi-manager structure can increase the chances of success. “

 

I would argue more broadly, despite the market outlook, any passive portfolio that only invests into the traditional markets of equities, bonds, and cash are not well diversified for a range of possible economic and market outcomes. They are further at risk if they take a set and forget approach to the overarching strategic asset class positioning of the fund i.e. these short-comings are not limited to passively managed Target-Date Funds.

 

In short, AB argue that the outlook for traditional markets (beta) is challenging. As a result, this environment pose:

“major headwinds to target-date funds as they work to provide the growth participants need. Target-date funds that invest only in traditional asset classes, such as large-cap equities and core bonds through indices, face limitations in their glide path designs. This can make it a struggle for target-date funds to meet participants’ needs in anything but a high-return, low-risk market environment. And in terms of environments, that ship has likely sailed for now.”

Further: “A lower-beta landscape challenges a popular line of thinking that says investing in funds with the lowest fees will ensure compliance with plan sponsors’ fiduciary responsibilities. Low fees aren’t the end all and be all. For one thing, focusing too much on fees could cause sponsors to overlook other factors in retirement investing that also have fiduciary implications.”

The bold is mine.

 

My Opinion and solution

Increase the diversification of the Target-Date Fund and more actively manage the glide path of the strategy.

There could well be a blend of active and passive strategies.

Quite obviously increasing true portfolio diversification is paramount to building robust portfolios and increasing the likelihood of achieving investment objectives.

The prospect of a low returning environment only reinforces this position.

As mentioned in my last post, Reports of the death of Diversification are greatly exaggerated, also see my post Invest more like an Endowment, which also touches on the fee debate, investors should seek true portfolio diversification. The portfolio should be constructed to meet an investor’s objectives “through a range of potential outcomes”. There would appear to be a diverse range of likely economic and market outcomes currently.

Robust portfolios are positioned for a range of outcomes and are “forecast-free as possible”.

We all know a robust portfolio is broadly diversified across different risks and returns.   Increasingly institutional investors are accepting that portfolio diversification does not come from investing in more and more asset classes. True portfolio diversification is achieved by investing in different risk factors that drive the asset classes e.g. duration, economic growth, low volatility, value, and growth.

 

Limitations of Target Date Funds

The AB article touches on the limitations of most Target-Date Funds, weather the underlying asset classes are actively or Index (passively) managed.

Essentially, most Target-Date Funds have two main short comings:

  • They are not customised to an individual’s consumption liability, human capital or risk preference e.g. they do not take into consideration by way of example future income requirements or likely endowments, level of income earned to retirement, or investor’s risk profile.

They are prescribed asset allocations which are the same for all investors who have the same number of years to retirement, this is the trade-off for scale over customisation.

  • The glide path does not take into account current market conditions.

Therefore, linear glide paths, most target date funds, do not exploit mean reversion in assets prices which may require:

      • Delays in pace of transitioning from risky assets to safer assets
      • May require step off the glide path given extreme risk environments

Most Target-Date funds don’t make revisions to asset allocations due to market conditions. This is inconsistent with academic prescriptions, and also common sense, which both suggest that the optimal strategy should also display an element of dependence on the current state of the economy.

 

Therefore, there is the risk that some Target-Date Funds will fall short of providing satisfactory outcomes and meeting the key requirement in retirement of sufficient income. See A more Robust Retirement Income Solution is needed.

Target-Date Funds (Life Cycle Funds) focus on the investment horizon without protecting investors’ retirement needs, they focus on one risk, market risk.   The focus is not on producing retirement income or hedging risks in relation to investment risk, inflation risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk. A better solution is required.

 

The optimal Target-Date fund asset allocation should be goal based and multi-period:

  • It requires customisation by goals, of human capital, and risk preferences
  • Some mechanism to exploit the possibility of mean reversion within market

 

Happy investing.

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

Why Low-Cost Index Investing Is Not Necessarily Low Risk

The US equity market has become more concentrated and not for the first time in history.

Current market concentration has been compared to 1999.

The market observations in this short article are consistent with the recently published Research by Research Affiliates, which I covered in a recent post, Buy High and Sell Low with Index Funds.

 

Happy investing.

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

Reports of the death of Diversification are greatly exaggerated.

Is Portfolio Diversification dead?

One could think so given the extraordinary performance of equities over the last five to six years and the absence of a significant market correction.

The US equity market is likely to record its longest running bull market in August of this year, which is the longest period of time without a 20% or more fall in value.  The equity market correction in February/March of this year ended a record period of historically low volatility for US equities, having experienced their longest period in history without a 5% or greater fall in value.

 

This is a theme picked up by Joe Wiggins in a recent post on his Blog site, Behavioural Investment, titled “The Death of Diversification”.

Wiggins proposes that the success of equities over the last few years could be used by some to argue as evidence of the failure of portfolio diversification.  Furthermore, such has been the superior performance of equities that some could argue “prudent diversification” is no longer important.

The benign environment could well lead some to believe this, reflecting there has been “scant reward” for holding other assets.  Diversification has come at a “cost”.

Of course such a worldly view, if held, is rubbish.

Wiggins does not hold these views.  He does however indicate it is hard in this environment to argue for the benefits of diversification.

Nevertheless the benefits of portfolio diversification still exist.

It is not a time to become complacent, nor suffer from FOMO (Fare of missing out).

 

Building robust and truly diversified portfolios will never go out of fashion.

This is well summed up in Wiggins’s post:

“The idea of diversification is to create a portfolio that is designed to meet the requirements of an investor through a range of potential outcomes – it should be as forecast-free as possible. It is also founded on the concept of owning assets that not only provide diversification in a quantitative sense (through low historic correlations) but also sound economic reasons as to why their return stream is likely to differ from other candidate asset classes. Crucially, in a genuinely diversified portfolio not all of the assets or holdings will be delivering strong results at any given time, indeed, if all of the positions in a portfolio are ‘working’ in unison – it will feel like a success but actually represent a shortcoming.

 

Well said.

I like the turn of phrase: as forecast-free as possible.

In my opinion, a portfolio still needs to be dynamically managed and tilted to reflect extreme valuations and a shifting economic environment, the focus should be on factors rather than asset classes.

Invest like an Endowment, seek true diversification and always remember the long-term benefits of diversification.  The portfolio should be constructed to meet an investor’s objectives “through a range of potential outcomes”.

There would appear to be a diverse range of likely economic and market outcomes currently.

Robust portfolios are positioned for a range of outcomes and “forecast-free as possible”.

We all know a robust portfolio is broadly diversified across different risks and returns.   Increasingly institutional investors are accepting that portfolio diversification does not come from investing in more and more asset classes.  True portfolio diversification is achieved by investing in different risk factors that drive the asset classes e.g. duration, economic growth, low volatility, value, and growth.

 

I’ll leave the final comment from a great post from Wiggins:

“At this point in the cycle the temptation to abandon the concept of prudent portfolio diversification is likely to prove particularly strong; but unless a new paradigm is upon us, investors will be well-served remaining faithful to sound and proven investment principles.  Take the long-term view and remain diversified”

 

Happy investing.

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

How long will the record US equities bull market run continue for?

An interesting view from JP Morgan.

The US Equity market is within a month of recording its longest ever bull market.  Many are expecting it to continue well into 2019.  The US economy will reaches its longest period of economic expansion in modern history July 2019.

History of Sharemarket corrections – An Anatomy of equity market corrections

 

JP Morgan view.

www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-19/jpmorgan-says-record-breaking-bull-market-could-run-until-2020

 

Happy investing.

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

Index Funds buy high and sell low…….

We know this.  This is related to an earlier post on the Limitations of Passive Index Investing.

 

A recent Research Affiliates article has looked into the cost of buying high and selling low by market indices and Index Funds.

Research Affiliates highlight that stocks added to market weighted indices are “routinely priced at a substantial premium to market valuation multiples (i.e., buying high), while discretionary deletions (excepting removals related to mergers, acquisitions, and other corporate actions) are routinely of deep-discount value stocks (i.e., selling low). In fact, additions tend to be priced at valuation multiples—using a blend of price-to-earnings (P/E), price-to-cash-flow (P/CF), price-to-book (P/B), price-to-sales (P/S), and (if available) price-to-dividends (P/D) ratios—that average over three times as expensive as those of deletions. This helps explain why from October 1989 through December 2017, the performance of additions lagged discretionary deletions by an average of over 2,200 basis points (bps) in the 12 months following the addition or deletion. Once investors recognize this buy-high/sell-low dynamic, they can avail themselves of some surprisingly simple ways to earn above-market returns”.

 

Obviously Index Fund providers understand this and may adjust their trading activities around additions and deletions from an index to minimise trading costs and impacts on performance.

A passive index solution is not passive, they are actively managed.

 

Nevertheless, there are costs around market index changes over time.  These costs are incurred by the Index Funds, yet the costs are not evident given they are also included in market index returns.

Given Index Funds look to closely match market index returns (low tracking error) they incur these costs.

Based on the Research Affiliates analysis if Index Funds were to tolerate a higher level of tracking error they would add value above the index they are tracking by avoiding the longer term costs of market index changes.  This is achieved largely by delaying changes to their portfolios.

Some serious thought needs to be given when appointing a passive index provider.

 

What are these costs?

The costs reflect that a stock outperforms over the period from the date it is announced it will be included in a market index until the effective date (when it is added to the market index).

Similarly, stocks removed from the market index underperform the market from the date of the announcement until effective date.

Research Affiliates estimates that additions outperform the market by 5.23% on average over the period between announcement date and effective date.

They also estimate that deletions underperformed the market by 4.29% on average over the period from announcement date to the day they are removed from the market index.

A total return different of 9.52%!  (this analysis was undertaken over the period October 1989 to December 2017)

 

Research Affiliates also estimate that over one-third of the performance differential takes place on the day the Index makes the changes (e.g. adds the new stocks and makes the deletions).

 

As Research Affiliates says, the additions win big before they are added to the market index and deletions lose big before they’re dropped out.

 

Furthermore, once a stock is added to a market index, on average it underperforms the market over the next twelve months.

Likewise, a stock deleted from the market index will on average outperform the market over the next 12 months.

 

There is value to be added around market index changes and more broadly the rebalancing policy of an investment portfolio.

 

Happy investing.

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

Is Sector exclusion Lazy? Responsible Investing

I have some sympathy with the view that excluding sectors is lazy.

Doing so alone does not make one a Responsible Investor (RI), more an ethical investor.

Nevertheless, excluding sectors (negative screening) could be part of an Investor’s RI approach.

 

This post is in response to a recent GoodReturns article, Sector exclusions lazy CIO says.

 

In my mind, RI can be thought of as a continuum, at one end is do nothing, non RI, and at the other end is ethical investing, which would include a number of exclusions depending on ethical positions.  In between are different shades of RI.  RI is a broad church.

For most institutional Investor’s their RI approach centres around the United Nations supported Principles of Responsible Investing (PRI).  PRI has six principles, see below.

 

Whatever the “Responsible Investing” approach it should be based on a documented policy, preferably approved by the Board.  The policy would provide RI philosophy, approach, and guidelines e.g. the exclusion of sectors based on a investment research position or set of values.

I think the approach to RI should be addressing the PRI’s six principles.

 

With regards to impact on performance.  I’d see RI as having the ability to add value, certainly improve risk-adjusted returns.  There is increasingly more evidence suggesting this, particularly at the stock selection level for equities and bonds.

Likewise, heading down the road of excluding a large number of sectors will increase variability of returns relative to broad market indices (that is the math).  Nevertheless, I’d argue this is ethical investing, not RI.  Perhaps the two will come closer together over time.  That will need a growing consensus of what sectors are acceptable and what are not i.e. tobacco has wide acceptance as being excluded currently.

 

RI to me is much more about risk management.  Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) factors can impact on the long term financial outcomes of a company and a broader portfolio.  Well researched ESG positions will improve risk-adjusted performance.  Such a research driven approach may result in the exclusion of some sectors.  It may also result in making investment decisions a non-RI approach would not consider e.g. impact investing or reducing a portfolio’s carbon exposure given changing government regulations and taxes.  I have a preference that the ESG approach focuses more on a portfolio’s financial impacts, rather than ethics.  Albeit, RI should be set within a sound philosophy and values framework.

The ESG factors should be integrated into the investment process, through selection and monitoring of investments.

Therefore, the consideration of ESG factors will help improve long term risk-adjusted returns, provide better insights into the risk of companies and potentially wider portfolio risk exposures, not just listed equities but unlisted assets such as infrastructure and property.  ESG assists in considering portfolio risks more broadly.  RI can make for more robust portfolios.

RI also includes engagement, with companies and the industry.  It is proactive, e.g. proxy voting and engagement with companies.  RI is a lot more than just excluding an equity market sector.  From this perspective, an investment manager can do more good through engagement than just excluded particular sectors.  They can make a conscious and research based decision not to invest in a company with the consideration of ESG factors.

RI is consistent with being a long term investor and stewardship.  In this regard, RI is as much about sustainable investing.

And that highlights a problem, there is so much terminology in our industry, particularly within this space.  This leads to inconsistency in meaning across the industry, which is reflected within the media e.g. Ethical Investing and Social Responsible Investing are often described as “RI”, which is not really true, at best it is at the far end of the RI continuum and based more on values than financial impacts, it is a subset of RI at best.

 

As an aside, one of the best books I have read on sustainable investing is, Sustainable Investing for Institutional Investors, by Mirjam Staub-Bisang.  I am interviewed in one of the chapters (no I don’t get any royalties) along with Amanda McCluskey, chpt 16.  Both are wonderful people.

 

 

Happy investing.

 

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

 

PRI Principles:

Principle 1: We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes.

Principle 2: We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices.

Principle 3: We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest.

Principle 4: We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry.

Principle 5: We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles.

Principle 6: We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles.

 

 

Bitcoin a speculative bubble – Robert Shiller

An interesting Bloomberg interview with Robert Shiller, Nobel economics prize winner.

Shiller’s most interesting response, when asked about the possible comparison with the 17th century tulip bubble in the Netherlands: “Tulips are still valued, there are some expensive tulips”.

 He also made some other interesting observations in the Bloomberg interview:

  • Bitcoin is a social movement whose popularity is split along geographical lines, it is more popular on the West Coast, Silico Valley in particular, than in the East Coast of America
  • It’s an epidemic of enthusiasm
  • It’s a speculative bubble, that does not mean that it will go to zero

 

Of course Bitcoin, along with the other cryptocurrencies, has fallen heavily over recent months as regulators around the world have increasingly taken a closer look, particularly from the perspective of money laundering.

Bitcoin is currently trading around $6,600, down from $20,000 in December 2017.  Ouch.

 

Happy investing.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

 

Andrew Ang on Factor Investing

Great interview with Andrew Ang on Factor investing.

 

Two key take outs from my perspective in relation to Factor Investing.

 

How to determine what factors to invest in?

  1. Ensure the factor generates a return as a reward for bearing a specific set of risks. The risk return profile results from market structures, an economic value, or investors’ behavioural bias.
  2. The excess return from the factor needs to be persistent and will be there over time.
  3. The factor is a unique and a differentiated source of return, different to the risk return profile of the market (beta), and lowly correlated with other factors.
  4. The factor is scalable, the factor can be delivered relatively cheaply and with scale.

 

As you know, there are lots of reported factors (the factor zoo). I tend to agree that there are a limited number, value, momentum, quality, size, and minimum volatility appear to have the greatest foundation of work in supporting their existence, economic rationale, and persistence over time.

 

How should factors be used?

  1. To complement an existing portfolio of active managers, preferable active managers with genuine idiosyncratic risk exposures e.g. non-factors more company specific risks.
  2.  Replace a traditional index exposure to get a more efficient market exposure, this could enhance your returns and/or reduce risk, see previous post on short comings of passive indexing.
  3.  Express a view within a portfolio e.g. over or under weight certain factors that are attractive or unattractive at certain points in the business cycle.

 

Happy investing.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

Limitations of Passive Index Investing

The short comings of investing into market index benchmarks are not widely discussed, nor understood.

Market indices suffer from two key short comings:

  1. They have exposures to unrewarded risks, they are therefore suboptimal e.g. think concentration risk, the best example of which is the Finnish Market Index which at one point Nokia made up over 50% of the Index. In New Zealand Telecom once made up over 30% of the Market Index.
  1. Poor Diversification of rewarding risk exposures e.g. they are not efficient. See discussion below.

 

The first short coming is well understood and often highlighted.  This is an issue with the current US market with the growing dominance of the Technology stocks which now make up 25% of the market.  Apple currently makes up around 4% of the S&P 500, this compares to IBM’s 7% weighting in the late 1970s.  Transport stocks dominated the S&P 500 for over 60 years in the mid-1880s to early 1900s.  Therefore unrewarded risks, such as concentration risks, have been a common feature of market indices and benchmarks.

 

The second short coming is less well understood.  In effect, market indices are poorly allocated to known risk premia from which excess returns can be generated from.

For example, and to the point, given their construction market indices are underweight the value and size premia.  These are known systematics risks for which investors are rewarded e.g. the value and size premia

 

Of course we are talking about the rise of Factor Investing, which I covered in an earlier post.

 

We are also not talking about a “factor zoo”, there are a number of limited rewarding risk premia, which are likely to include the likes of value and size (small cap), momentum, and low volatility.  Profitability, quality, and carry are potentially others to consider as well.  Implementation of Factor strategies is key.

 

Fama and French, the fathers of Finance, developed the 3 Factor model in the 1990s.  The 3 factor model includes market risk, value, and size.  It has now become a 5 factor model.  Their pioneering work forms the basis of a very successful global Funds Management business.

This stuff is not new, yet large amounts of money flow into the inefficient and sub-optimal market index funds.  Bond indices are more suboptimal than equity market indices.

 

Therefore, factor exposures provide a more efficient exposure for investors.

The go to analogy on understanding Factors comes from Professor Andrew Ang, factors in markets are like nutrients in food:

“Factors are to assets what nutrients are to food. Just like ‘eating right’ requires you to look through food labels to understand the nutrient content, ‘investing right’ means looking through asset class labels for the underlying factor risks. It’s the nutrients in the food that matter. And similarly, the factors matter, not the asset labels.”

 

Factor investing is part of a strong movement by institutional investors away from investing into “asset classes” but thinking more about looking through asset class labels and investing into the underlying factors.

 

Many institutional investors understand that true portfolio diversification does not come from investing in many different asset classes but comes from investing in different risk factors.

The objective is to implement a portfolio with exposures to a broad set of different return and risk outcomes.

True portfolio diversification is achieved by investing in different risk factors that drive the asset classes e.g. duration, economic growth, low volatility, value, and momentum.

 

This is part of a wider shift within the global Wealth and Funds Management industry.  The industrial revolution that EDHEC Risk discusses.  There are better ways of doing things, such as Goal Based Investing.

 

Remember, Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is over 65 years old, it is hardly modern anymore.  Although the fundamentals of the benefits of diversification remain, greater insights have been gained over the years and more efficient approaches to building robust portfolios have been developed.

 

Happy investing.

 

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.


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Asness on Hedge Fund Returns and Buffet Bet Revisited

Earlier in the year I wrote a post about the Buffett Bet.

To recap, “The Bet” was with Protégé Partners, who picked five “funds of funds” hedge funds they expected would outperform the S&P 500 over the 10 year period ending December 2017.

The bet was made in December 2007, when the market was reasonably expensive and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was just around the corner.

Needless to say, Buffet won.  The S&P 500 easily outperformed the Hedge Fund selection over the 10 year period.

I made three points earlier in the year:

  1. I’d never bet against Buffet!
  1. I would also not expect a Funds of Funds hedge Fund to consistently outperform the S&P 500, let alone a combination of five Funds of Fund.

This is not to say Hedged Funds should not form part of a “truly” diversified investment portfolio.  They should.  Nevertheless, I am unconvinced their role is to provide equity plus returns.

  1. Most, if not all, investor’s investment objective(s) is not to beat the S&P 500. Investment Objectives are personal and targeted e.g. Goal Based Investing to meet future retirement income or endowments

Finally, someone from the Hedge Fund Industry has come out a said it: Hedge Funds should not be compared to the performance of investing in equities.

Cliff Asness from AQR has, and not for the first time, recently written an article about why Hedge Fund returns should not be compared to equity market returns such as the S&P 500 Index, see The Hedgie in Winter.

The key point Asness makes is that Hedge Funds are not 100% invested in equities.  He estimates that they are in effect 50% invested in equities.  If we use beta terms, where a beta of 1.0 =  100% equities, Hedge Funds have a beta of 0.5.  (For those who are wondering what Beta is, Beta is a measure of how sensitivity an investment is to a market index e.g. S&P 500.  Put another way, how much of the returns from the market index can explain the returns of the investment.  Therefore, with a beta of 0.5 we would expect hedge funds to be less volatile than equities and equity markets performance would only explain some of the returns from hedge funds.)

Asness expresses it more succinctly:

“Comparing hedge funds to 100% equities is flat-out silly. Hedge funds have historically, rather consistently, delivered equity exposure (beta to my fellow geeks) just under 50%. In fact much of their point is, supposedly, to be different from equities. I mean that they are at least partly hedged investments. Put more bluntly, it is in the freaking name!”

That’s right, Hedge Funds look to reduce their equity market exposure, hedge it out.  Therefore they will not capture all of an equities market upside.  Similarly, when equity markets fall significantly, they are not capturing all of this downside as well! i.e. Hedge Funds tend to outperform equity markets in equity bear markets.

Certainly, hedge funds are not going to outperform equities in a strong bull market, as we have recently experienced, as they are not 100% invested in equities.  They are not equities.

Well, you probably would expect a hedge fund manager to say this.  Yip, but I would say he is right on the money.

Furthermore, it is not as if Asness lets Hedge Funds off the hook.  From further analysis in the paper Asness notes that Hedge Fund performance has been “petering out” since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  This means they have not added or subtracted much value since the GFC.

I take this to mean they have struggled to meet their investment objectives and historical rate of returns, albeit they may well have delivered mildly positive returns.  Which is not as disastrous as often reported.

The “petering out” of Hedge Fund performance is highlighted by Asness as an area of concern.  The data he presents provides no proofs as to why.  He concludes that Hedge Funds may be less special than before.

That is certainly something to dwell upon.  Hedge Funds can play an important role in a robust portfolio and achieving true portfolio diversification.  The observation by Asness should be considered in the selection of Hedge Fund managers and strategies.

Lastly, there is change occurring across the Hedge Funds industry.  This expected change is captured in the recently published AIMA paper (Alternative Investment Management Association), Perspectives, Industry leaders on the future of the Hedge Fund IndustryAIMA paper (Alternative Investment Management Association), Perspectives, Industry leaders on the future of the Hedge Fund Industry. This includes more transparency and lower fee structures.

From the report: “Most people today look to hedge funds for diversification, i.e., an alternate return stream, with low beta and correlation to traditional investments. In the past, the driver of hedge fund interest was high expected returns and growth of capital.”

This is consistent with Hedge Funds playing a valuable role in a truly diversified portfolio.

Happy investing.

Please see my Disclosure Statement

 

Global Investment Ideas from New Zealand. Building more Robust Investment Portfolios.

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